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Fiscal consolidations, episodes where governments make large discretionary 
improvements in their fiscal positions, have received considerable attention, 
especially in EMU. The existing literature demonstrates that the composition of 
consolidations is a crucial determinant of their success. We show that sub-central 
governments also play a key role in consolidations through sustained cuts in 
expenditures, as their intergovernmental grants are cut. In contrast to existing studies 
we find that cuts in capital spending at sub-central levels are a feature of successful 
consolidations. We also show that the government type and the nature of fiscal 
arrangements in a country impact on these results. 
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 1. Introduction   
 
Fiscal consolidations, that is episodes where governments make large discretionary 
improvements in their fiscal positions, have dominated much of both political and 
academic discussion of fiscal policy in recent years. In Europe, during the run up to 
EMU and since the launch of the Stability and Growth Pact, the focus has been on 
achieving sound sustainable government finances. However, this drive toward 
consolidation has been shared throughout most OECD countries and is also a key 
issue in emerging markets, keen to avoid a repeat of financial crises. However, 
adjustment has not been easy and some previous bastions of fiscal prudence are 
now struggling to maintain or regain sound fiscal positions. In addition, the potential 
‘pension crisis’ facing many countries means that the issue of fiscal consolidation will 
remain central.  
 
The established literature on fiscal consolidations, see for example, Alesina and 
Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Von Hagen 
et al. (2001), have concluded that the composition of the consolidation effort is a 
crucial determinant of the ultimate effect on debt. Consolidation attempts that focus 
upon key elements of government expenditure are more likely to lead to sustained 
falls in a country’s debt to GDP ratio than those based upon revenue increases.  
 
In this paper we advance this literature in two principal directions. Firstly, previous 
studies of fiscal consolidation have focussed upon general government data
1. This 
has one clear advantage, in that large and consistent data sets are readily available. 
However, in our view, this advantage is outweighed by a key weakness: the 
approach implicitly assumes that governments behave as if a single authority 
exercises complete control over the size and composition of fiscal balances. Indeed, 
political economy models of fiscal consolidations, including Alesina and Drazen 
(1991), and Roubini and Sachs (1989), assume a single tier of government. 
However, as outlined in Darby et al. (2003), sub-central governments play a 
substantial role in the conduct of fiscal policy within a given country. We therefore 
believe that it is worth extending the existing literature to look at the respective 
contributions made by sub-central and central government and to examine how these 
tiers of government interact during consolidation attempts. 
                                                      
1 General government is defined by the OECD as “all departments, offices, organisations and 
other bodies which are agencies or instruments of the central, state or local public authorities” 
OECD [2002].  
  1Secondly, previous attempts to obtain a descriptive picture of fiscal behavior during 
consolidation attempts have tended to focus their attention on the period of 
consolidation – see for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Darby et al. (2005a). 
Little is known of the behavior of fiscal policy in the immediately surrounding periods. 
Studies that have looked at fiscal behavior in the surrounding periods have tended to 
do so in a largely ad hoc manner. We believe that it is important to obtain a clear 
picture of systematic changes in fiscal variables not just in the period of consolidation 
but also in the periods surrounding consolidation.  
 
In this paper we adopt an event study approach to explore how sub-central tiers of 
government react to major discretionary policy shifts at the central level during 
consolidation attempts. Specifically, we construct a panel dataset for the major 
OECD economies and assess how central and sub-central expenditures, taxation, 
and intergovernmental grants change in response to governments’ attempts to 
correct their fiscal positions. Episodes of fiscal consolidation are identified using a 
methodology which has become standard in the macroeconomics literature (see 
Blanchard, 1983, Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, Alesina et al., 1998). The event 
analyses then allows us to examine the timing of expenditure, taxation and 
intergovernmental grant shifts around the periods of fiscal consolidation. We also 
develop this analysis by distinguishing between successful consolidations (i.e. ones 
that have a significant impact on a country's debt to GDP ratio) and unsuccessful 
consolidations, which do not and show signs of being temporary. In addition to 
addressing issues related to interactions between central and sub-central tiers of 
government, we are also able to shed light on the extent to which sub-central tiers of 
government participate in fiscal consolidations, and hence to macroeconomic 
adjustment. Finally, by grouping countries according to various characteristics, we 
can use regression analysis to examine whether some patterns of reaction to fiscal 
consolidations are particularly applicable to certain groups of countries. 
 
To anticipate our key results, we begin by showing that the majority of consolidations 
involve shared effort across tiers of government. We also replicate a result from the 
existing literature: that successful consolidations tend to be based upon expenditure 
cuts as opposed to increases in revenue. The first new result we obtain shows that 
successful fiscal consolidations at central government level bring with them similar, 
and sustained, cuts in expenditure at the sub-central level. Indeed, in the case of 
successful consolidation attempts, a pattern emerges in which central governments 
first cut intergovernmental transfers to lower tiers of government and then, rather 
  2than raising sub-central revenues, the sub-central tier make cuts in their expenditure. 
In short, it appears that successful fiscal consolidations are characterized by 
cutbacks in intergovernmental grants, which are more than matched by cutbacks in 
sub-central expenditures. It therefore appears that there is a strong correlation 
between success in consolidating central fiscal deficits and similar actions from lower 
tiers of government. 
 
In contrast, periods of consolidation that are unsuccessful are typically characterized 
by temporary increases in central taxation revenues, an absence of any change in 
intergovernmental grants, no tendency for change in sub-central tax revenues, and 
only a small temporary reduction in sub-central expenditures.  
 
Third, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) identified cutbacks in capital expenditures at 
central government level as a prevalent feature of unsuccessful fiscal consolidations. 
Our disaggregate analysis reveals that, where consolidations are successful, sub-
central tiers of government have to make significant cuts in their capital expenditures. 
This would appear to imply that the burden of adjustment to investment falls onto 
lower tiers of government. Furthermore, it would appear that central governments 
worry less about the long-term (i.e. public investment) consequences of 
consolidation, if these decisions are taken at local level. In addition, there is evidence 
that when faced with cuts in intergovernmental grants during consolidations, sub-
central governments tend to maintain expenditures on wages at the expense of 
capital expenditure: there seems to be a definite switch towards public consumption. 
This might be interpreted as a variant of the effect identified by Gramlich (1987): in 
that sub-central governments appear to seek to defend current service provision 
while reducing spending on infrastructure and resisting raising taxation. This could be 
explained by the fact that in many of the OECD countries in our sample the 
states/regions and local authorities have much more limited powers to vary taxation 
than in the USA. In a companion paper, Darby et al. (2005b), we demonstrate that 
this behavior is evident across all instances when grants are cut and not just in 
periods of consolidation.  
 
Finally, we find that the institutional arrangements in countries (the government type 
and the nature of the fiscal arrangements) do impact at the margin on the results. In 
particular, coalition governments tend to be less likely to cut grants to sub-central 
governments during fiscal consolidation attempts. 
 
  3The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the 
data and briefly summarize the importance of sub-central tiers of government in the 
countries in our sample.  In Section 3 we discuss the identification of consolidation 
attempts. Section 4 sets out the econometric methodology, Section 5 reports our 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Scope of the Study  
 
The data used in this study are annual and taken primarily from IMF Government 
Financial Statistics (GFS), 2002 Edition, supplemented with data from the OECD 
Statistical Compendium, 2002 Edition. GFS provides the best internationally 
comparable data on fiscal variables for fifteen OECD countries that are 
disaggregated by tier of government
2, subdivided between three levels (central, state 
and local categories). These data allow us to construct an unbalanced panel dataset 
with 336 observations covering the period 1970-99. A full description of the data is 
provided in an Appendix.  
 
The dataset we employ does have some weaknesses. First, little or no distinction is 
made between tax revenues from taxes, where the sub-central tiers control both the 
tax rates and/or the tax base, and revenues from tax sharing arrangements, this has 
led us to supplement the GFS data using OECD (1999) and information provided by 
Jonathan Rodden of MIT for Canada and the USA. In our empirical work we use this 
additional data to distinguish between countries in terms of their differing degrees of 
fiscal autonomy
3. Another second weakness is that, to the extent that central 
government's can exert influence on sub-central spending patterns through directives 
(see Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002), GFS will overstate the true nature of sub-central 
expenditure autonomy. Nonetheless, the GFS data remain the best available for our 
purposes. 
 
3.  Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Attempts 
 
In common with the existing literature, we define a fiscal consolidation as a 
discretionary attempt to improve general government fiscal balances. This of course 
requires that we abstract from the effects of automatic stabilizers and interest 
                                                      
2 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. 
3 Unfortunately, no such data appears to be readily available for Australia and France, so in 
the extensions to the basic analysis that involve fiscal autonomy data we have to drop some 
sample observations. 
  4payments on outstanding debt, to focus movements in the structural primary balance 
as a proportion of GDP. While there is no universally accepted way of decomposing 
the primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio into its cyclical and discretionary 
components
4, we adopt the methodology used in Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), 
and Alesina et al. (1998), who follow Blanchard (1993) in using the constructed fiscal 
impulses to measure discretionary changes in fiscal policy from one year to the next. 
 
For each country in our sample, we construct the Blanchard measure of the fiscal 
impulses by regressing each component of the primary balance on unemployment, a 
constant, and a linear and quadratic time trend. We then calculate predicted values 
for components of the primary balance, conditional on the previous year's 
unemployment rate, giving the predicted cyclically adjusted primary balance. The 
Blanchard measure of the structural fiscal impulse is then calculated by subtracting 
the predicted cyclically adjusted primary balance from its actual value
5. 
     
Having constructed a measure of discretionary changes in fiscal policy for each 
country, there are two ways of proceeding. The first is simply to use this measure as 
part of a cross country panel dataset to examine common features which 
characterize shifts in general government discretionary fiscal policy. However, the 
problem with this approach is that the measured discretionary fiscal impulse is 
unlikely to be zero even where there is no discretionary policy action enacted by 
governments, simply because there is no perfect way of decomposing automatic and 
discretionary fiscal changes. The risk is that any statistical analysis based on such a 
dataset will lack statistical power. A second way of proceeding is to focus on 
significant changes in discretionary fiscal policy. This will ensure that our results are 
not driven unduly by cyclical changes. An operational definition of a significant 




Definition 1: A period of fiscal consolidation is deemed to have occurred in a given 
year if the discretionary general government fiscal impulse is greater than or equal to 
1.5% of GDP. 
                                                      
4 For a discussion, see Gramlich (1990), Bouthevillain and Quinet (1999), Bruni and Tujula 
(1999) and Chalk (2002). 
5 Bruni and Tujula (1999) compare the Blanchard measure of fiscal impulses with a cyclical 
adjustment of the primary balance that uses the Hodrick-Prescott filter. They find that the 
Blanchard measure corresponds more closely to periods of expansionary or tight fiscal stance 
as identified by economic commentators. It also has the merit of not relying on somewhat 
arbitrary measures of potential output and base years. 
6 For similar subjective criteria see Giavazzi et al. (2000), von Hagen et al. (2001). 
  5This definition allows us to identify a number of consolidation episodes from the 
panel data. These episodes can be classified further into successful or unsuccessful. 
To be more precise, we again follow previous studies on fiscal consolidation (see, for 
example, Alesina and Perotti (1995)) in defining a subjective criterion for the success 




Definition 2: A fiscal consolidation is deemed to be successful if, three years after the 
consolidation attempt, the ratio of debt to GDP is at least 5 percentage points below 
the level observed immediately prior to the consolidation attempt. 
 
Having identified a number of periods of significant fiscal consolidation, we can 
analyze our data. As we shall see below, a useful approach is provided by the 
methodology of event studies. Using definition 1, we can identify 61 separate 
consolidation attempts
8. Of these, using definition 2, 22 conform to our definition of 
success. Table 1 reports the countries and date for which we have identified fiscal 
consolidation attempts. As might be expected, nearly all (59 out of 61) general 
government consolidation attempts are either led by central government or involve 
both tiers of government. There are only 2 cases in which the sub-central tier 
consolidated when no consolidation effort could be identified at the central tier. 
 
4. Econometric  Methodology 
 
Event studies provide a regression based method of examining the time profile of key 
variables of interest around the time of specific events, in our case fiscal 
consolidations. Event studies are less common in macroeconomics, but are more 
commonplace in finance
9. Here we use the event study approach to compare and 
contrast significant changes in key fiscal variables before, during, and after a year 
identified as corresponding to a fiscal consolidation attempt, as compared to 'normal' 
or reference conditions, i.e. non-consolidation years. This allows is to obtain the 
predicted time profile for each of the fiscal variables (expressed as percentages of 
                                                      
7 In practice, the results seem robust to different definitions of 'success', including the use of a 
success index. For an application using a particular four point success index, which makes a 
distinction between arresting the growth of debt, debt stabilization and debt reduction, see 
Darby et al. (2005a). 
8 We find that the identification of consolidation attempts alters little if we adopt alternative 
methods to measure the discretionary fiscal impulse based on application of the Hodrick 
Prescott filter or the OECD's measure of the output gap. 
9 See for instance MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997) where these methods are 
used to examine the impact of 'news', such as the announcement of profit figures, on share 
prices both in the immediate and surrounding periods. 
 
  6GDP) both during the period of consolidation and in periods immediately prior to, and 
after, the fiscal impulse. More specifically, each event window comprises five years; 
two years prior the fiscal consolidation attempt, the period of the consolidation itself, 
and the two years that follow. The length of the event window is a choice variable, 
and was chosen based upon the significance of the time in the relevant regressions. 
Our results suggest that the window encompassing two years prior to consolidation 
and two years after is appropriate.  
 
The econometric methods we employ are similar to those used by Tornell and 
Westermann (2002) in an analysis of business cycles around the time of financial 
crises. We apply panel data methods, where the panel regressions include fixed 
effects to account for cross-country heterogeneity and we use Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) to account for the effects of heteroscedasticity
10. Each fiscal variable 
is regressed over the entire sample (for all countries, i, and all time periods, t) on a 
series of time dummies. The parameters attached to the time dummies capture the 
time profile of the variables. More precisely, the coefficients on the time dummies 
should capture the differences between each period in the event window relative to 
non-consolidation years. 
 
We carry out two sets of regressions. First we examine all consolidation attempts 
collectively, where T is defined as the actual year of a consolidation attempt: 
  −− + −+ = +++ + ++ i,t i i, T i, T i, T i, T i, T i,t yD D D D D α βββ β β 12 21 3 4 1 52 1 ε
                                                     
 (1) 
where yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, and Di,T+j are time 
dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the consolidation period, and zero in all 
other periods. 
 
Second, we subdivide the set of identified fiscal consolidations into the 'successful' 
and 'unsuccessful' categories and perform the following regression: 
 
10 In a recent paper Bertrand et al. (2004) note that 'difference in differences' estimates might 
be affected by the presence of serial correlation. Although our study does not take a 
conventional 'difference in differences' approach, it is possible that the presence of serial 
correlation could result in inconsistently estimated standard errors. To explore this issue in 
our context we conducted two robustness checks: first, we added a lagged dependent 
variable to each regression; and second, we re-estimated our regressions using a GLS 
(Cochrane-Orcutt) estimator. In both cases we found only minor changes in the size of the 
coefficients and no qualitative changes in the significance of the time dummies. We continue 
to report the OLS estimates because of the difficulty in plotting event windows in the presence 
of lagged dependent variables. We are grateful to Thiess Buettner, for pointing this issue out 
to us. 
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where again yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t,   are time 
dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the successful consolidation period 
(denoted t=P) and zero in all other periods and   are time dummies, equal to 1 
in +j/-j periods from the unsuccessful consolidation period (denoted t=Q) and zero in 








Each estimated coefficient (βk,  ϕk, δk) captures the estimated difference between 
period k in the event window and the average position in non-consolidation years. 
Thus, for instance, if the dependent variable is the annual change in central 
government expenditure, a significantly negative β  implies that in the year prior to 
the consolidation the change in central government expenditure was significantly 
lower than in non-consolidation years (the 'normal', or reference period). 
 
As we shall see below, having estimated the standard event study regression it may 
be useful to see if individual countries or groups of countries display significantly 
different behavior from the rest of the countries in the event sample. For instance, we 
might wish to consider whether those countries with different types of central 
government (e.g. coalition or single-party governments) display different behavior in 
terms of fiscal adjustment at central and sub-central level. Or we might want to 
consider if countries with federal rather than unitary structures display a different 
adjustment pattern. Equation 1 can be modified to incorporate tests of these 
hypotheses by including an interactive dummy variable: 
yD D D D D
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  (3)     
where Cl is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity in the case of a particular 
country or group of countries and is equal to zero in all other cases. The estimated 
coefficient on the interactive dummy variable captures the additional effect of this 
category of country over and above that identified by the standard dummies. For 
instance, taking the previous example, if Cl is a dummy representing the current 
Eurozone countries, a significantly negative λ1 would indicate that in the year of a 
consolidation attempt, central government expenditure is significantly lower than in 
non-Eurozone countries during fiscal consolidations. 
 
  85. Results 
 
We present our results in a series of graphs, shown in Figures 1 to 22. As noted 
above, we consider all the consolidations which fall into Definition 1, and then sub-
divide them into the categories of successful and unsuccessful, using Definition 2.  
The upper row of graphs in each panel shows the time profile for the fiscal variable of 
interest (e.g. fiscal impulse, change in expenditure etc.) for all consolidations, 
successful consolidations, and unsuccessful consolidations respectively. In addition 
to plotting the coefficients we also show the relevant standard error bands which 
allow easy identification of the time periods in which a given estimated change is 
significantly different from zero. The lower row of graphs in each panel shows the 
cumulative change in the fiscal variable of interest which is obtained by summing the 
respective coefficients over the event window. Again, alongside these cumulative 
changes we show the relevant asymptotic standard error bands.  
 
Figure 1 shows the extent to which consolidations have involved an improvement in 
the fiscal position of the central government, as measured by the annual change in 
the Blanchard fiscal impulse. 
 
  Figure 1:  Central Government Fiscal Impulse





































































































































































By definition, fiscal consolidations have involved sizeable central government fiscal 
impulses in period T. It is also interesting to note that the time profile of the 
consolidations around period T is similar regardless of whether the fiscal 
consolidation is ultimately successful or not. However, the cumulative plots indicate 
that successful fiscal consolidations have typically involved a larger cumulative fiscal 
contraction (shown as a positive fiscal impulse), as the improvements at time T are 
amplified in post-consolidation periods. 
  9 
  Figure 2:  Sub-Central Government Fiscal Impulse
































































































































































Figure 2 shows the discretionary fiscal impulse implemented by the sub-central tiers 
of government, and shows how they fared during these general government 
consolidation attempts. It is interesting that the consolidation effort is shared between 
tiers of government as indicated by the fact that the period T dummies attract positive 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero. This suggests that contractions 
in the discretionary fiscal balance are significant larger during consolidation years
11. 
We also identify a major difference between successful and unsuccessful 
consolidations; in the former, sub-central tiers of government share a considerable 
part of the burden of macroeconomic adjustment. Also note that in the period 
following the discretionary fiscal tightening there is a partial reversal at sub-central 
level (the T+1 dummies attract negative coefficients that are significantly less than 
zero). This may indicate some resistance to the consolidation effort. 
 
A fundamental question of interest is whether a greater degree of fiscal 
decentralization implies less control over fiscal policy at sub-central level? Rodden 
(2002) and Rodden and Wibbels (2003) and Tanzi (2001), have argued that greater 
fiscal decentralization might result in a potential deterioration in macroeconomic 
control, since sub-central tiers of government have an incentive to focus myopically 
on local issues. Although we do not attempt to answer this question directly, we do 
examine the extent to which the group of most decentralized countries contribute to 
overall consolidation attempts, and gauge whether there is evidence of greater 
                                                      
11 Note that the movement in the sub-central impulse will also be affected by any change in 
grants from central government. 
  10resistance to central government consolidation efforts within such countries. In Figure 
3 we have divided the sample into groups of countries with 'high' and 'low' degrees of 
fiscal decentralization. To be precise, the division is made using the percentage of 
expenditure and revenue assigned to the sub-central tier with eight countries 




  Figure 3:  Sub-Central Fiscal Impulse split by level of decentralization






















































The results represented in Figure 3 shows that the average fiscal impulse is 
significantly larger in the 'most decentralized' countries at time T. The improvement, 
relative to non-consolidation years, is as much as 0.5% of GDP. Thus, a high degree 
of decentralization does not seem to be inconsistent with the sub-central tiers of 
government sharing the burden of adjustment. As we shall see below, concurrent 
cuts in central government grants appear to be an important element behind this 
shared adjustment. 
 
Having looked at the time profile of the overall fiscal positions, we now examine the 
detailed evolution of total expenditures and revenues and their key components 
during the event window. Note that we examine total expenditure defined as total 
primary expenditure excluding intergovernmental transfers (i.e. excluding interest 
payments and transfers to other levels of national government), to avoid double 
counting. Similarly total revenue includes all tax and non-tax revenues but excludes 
grants received from other tiers of national government. Intergovernmental grants 
and transfers are analyzed separately. 
 
                                                      
12 The eight countries in the 'high' category are Australia, Denmark, Canada, Germany, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the USA, while the seven countries in the 'low' category are 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands. In addition, we also 
differentiated our sample along a related characteristic, whether the countries are federal or 
unitary. In practice there is a substantial overlap between these two categorisations. The 
results for 'federal' countries were similar to those for 'highly decentralised' countries. 
 
  11Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of central and sub-central total expenditure 
during consolidation attempts. Figures 6-13 show the equivalent plots for the 
components of total expenditure (respectively wages, social transfer payments, 
goods and services and capital expenditure). A number of points can be noted from 
these results. First, as can be seen from figures 4 and 5, the key difference between 
successful and unsuccessful consolidation attempts is that the successful 
consolidations involve consistently tightened expenditure over time, and not just in 
the period of the consolidation attempt (T). In fact, sustained cuts are evident in the 
majority of the components of spending, with the exception of central and sub-central 
governments’ capital expenditure.  
 
  Figure 4:  Central Government Total Expenditure


















































































































































































  Figure 5:  Sub-Central Government Total Expenditure
























































































































































































  12Second, Alesina and Perotti (1997) suggested that cuts in social welfare spending 
and wages tend to be evident in successful consolidation attempts; and they stressed 
that the signaling effect of these types of cuts, through which central governments 
can demonstrate an important commitment to fiscal control
13. Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 
confirm Alesina and Perotti’s observation in that significant and sustained cuts are 
made in the central government wage bill and in social transfers across both 
successful and failed consolidations, but the size of the cut is larger, and the 
demonstration effect stronger, in the successful case.  
 
Third, it is usually argued (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, and McDermott and 
Wescott, 1996) that capital expenditure cuts tend to be unsustainable and are more 
of a feature of unsuccessful consolidations. Figures 12 and 13 show that central 
governments tend to cut capital expenditure by more during unsuccessful 
consolidation attempts, but this picture is reversed at sub-central government. It 
appears that some of the financial pressure on sub-central governments is translated 
into lower levels of public investment, and the difference between successful and 




Figure 6:  Central Government Wage Bill


















































































































































































   
 
 
                                                      
13 Alesina and Perotti (1997) also argue that outside of consolidation periods social transfers 
and wages have a strong tendency to automatically increase. This is supported by the 
average fixed effects in our estimated model, for both wages and social trensfers they tend to 
be positive. 
  13Figure 7:  Sub-Central Government Wage Bill






































































































































































  Figure 8:  Central Government Social Transfers


















































































































































































  Figure 9:  Sub-Central Government Social Transfers
























































































































































































  14  Figure 10:  Central Government Expenditure on Goods and Services



















































































































































































  Figure 11:  Sub-Central Govt. Expenditure on Goods and Services















































































































































































  Figure 12:  Central Government Capital Expenditure













































































































































































   
  15Figure 13:  Sub-Central Government Capital Expenditure

































































































































































































Turning to the revenues, Figures 14-20 show the evolution of central and sub-central 
government revenues and their components.   
 
  Figure 14:  Central Government Total Revenue




































































































































































Figure 14 demonstrates another point made in Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) that, 
in the year of the consolidation, unsuccessful attempts are characterized by 
increases in fiscal revenues (rather than expenditure cuts). Note that while central 
government revenues rise during both successful and failed consolidation attempts, 
the size of this increase is larger in the failed attempts. In fact, the temporary 
increase in revenues is almost completely reversed in the following year, as indicated 
in the significant negative effect at T+1. The cumulative change in the profile of 
revenues is similar in both successful and failed consolidation attempts. The 
  16temporary nature of the revenue hikes is not evident in the Alesina-Perotti studies 
because their analysis does not include the periods following the actual consolidation 
attempts.  
 
Figure 15 shows that unsuccessful attempts seem to be characterized more by an 
increase in sub-central governments' revenues.  
   
Figure 15:  Sub-Central Government Total Revenue

























































































































































































Breaking down revenues into taxation and other charges (including user charges), as 
shown in Figures 16-19, one can see that there is a tendency for sub-central 
governments to raise taxation
14 in the period of the consolidation. There is also a 
tendency for user charges and fees  (non-tax revenues) to be somewhat lower in the 
case of successful consolidations, although the difference is barely significant. We 
conclude that revenue adjustments appear to contribute little to the cumulative profile 
of fiscal consolidations at central or sub-central levels. Furthermore, where revenue 
adjustments are present, they appear to be more likely to be associated with 








                                                      
14 Although it should be remembered that we do not distinguish at this point between taxation 
increases where the base and yield is under the control of sub-central government and 
increases in shared taxation revenues. 
  17 
 
  Figure 16:  Central Government Taxation Revenues









































































































































































































   
Figure 17:  Sub-Central Government Taxation Revenues
























































































































































































  Figure 18:  Central Government Non-Tax Revenues
  All Successful  Unsuccessful 

















































































































































































































   
Figure 19:  Sub-Central Government Non-Tax Revenues








































































































































































































What seems to matter more, in terms of the success of fiscal consolidation attempts, 
is the role played by intergovernmental grants and transfers. Figure 20 shows the 
extent to which central governments adjust sub-central grants around the time of 
fiscal consolidations. It is important to note that all the countries in our sample exhibit 
some degree of vertical imbalance in that expenditures at the sub-central tier exceed 
own-source revenues with the difference being financed by central government 
grants
15. It therefore seems likely that any changes in grants will impact heavily on 
sub-central governments. 
 
   
Figure 20:  Sub-Central Government Grants
  All Successful  Unsuccessful 
                                                      
15 See Figure 4. 


































































































































































The significant negative parameters on the T, T+1, and T+2 dummies in the upper 
row of panel T show that, relative to the reference category, substantial cuts are 
made to sub-central governments' grant allocations both during and after 
consolidation attempts. It is also apparent that this result is driven almost entirely by 
the experience of successful consolidations. The cumulative change in grants during 
successful consolidations is about -1.3% of GDP, while the average change outside 
the event window is 0.2%. In contrast, the cumulative change is not significantly 
different from the average fixed effect during unsuccessful consolidations. Clearly 
cuts in grants are central to fiscal consolidation efforts by central governments: by 
cutting the finance available in effect they force the hands of the decision makers 
within the lower tiers of government. In a companion paper Darby, Muscatelli and 
Roy (2005b), we examine cuts in grants more closely, to see whether, and when, 
sub-central governments respond to such pressures by cutting expenditures, and 
when instead they choose to raise taxes. For the moment, at least while we focus on 
fiscal consolidations, there would appear to be evidence of a kind of reverse 'fly-
paper effect', in that cuts in grants lead to cuts in sub-central expenditure.  
 
Our final focus is on the extent to which the nature and stability of the central 
government impacts on fiscal decisions. To conduct this analysis we use data 
provided in Woldendorp et al. (2000) to differentiate the identified consolidation 
episodes according to the 'type of government' enacting the adjustment. Woldendorp 
et al. define six types of government but, given the constraints of our sample size, we 
aggregate these up to three classes: i) single party parliamentary majority, ii) 
coalition parliamentary majority and iii) parliamentary minority with a single party or a 
  20coalition. The type of government in the actual period of consolidation is used as the 
discriminating factor in the context of equation (3)
16.  
 
  Figure 21:  Central Government Total Expenditure































































   
Figure 22:  Sub-Central Government Grants




















































Figures 21 and 22 show, respectively, the annual change in central government 
expenditures and cuts in grants made by single party and coalition central 
governments. As can be seen in Figure 21,  there is only a slight difference in the 
expenditure-cutting behavior of these types of government. However, we note from 
Figure 22 that coalition governments seem less likely to cut sub-central grants. By 
contrast, the single-party dummies are significantly negative at the 10% level. Cutting 
sub-central grants, like any other category of current expenditure is likely to be 
politically difficult. This is consistent with strong and less fragmented governments 
finding it easier to deal with the potential backlash from local government. The 
reluctance to address sub-central finances may partially explain the lower probability 




                                                      
16 It is possible that changes in the type of government in power can take place within a 
particular event window. In practice this happens only rarely in our dataset and has little 
impact on our results. 
17 In addition, we have examined whether or not differences in central government ideology 
have an impact on the consolidation attempts by dividing our observations along partisan 
lines (i.e. Left, Right and Center). We found no significant differences between the groups and 
our results are available on request. 
  216. Conclusions 
 
Our paper has established an important role for sub-central government in fiscal 
adjustment. Using comparative data on sub-central government variables and on 
inter-governmental grants, we have provided a picture of how sub-central tiers of 
government play a role during periods of fiscal consolidation, and how grants play a 
key role in forcing sub-central governments to adjust. We use event study analysis to 
examine not only how governments react to these adjustment episodes, but also the 
time profile of the adjustment. 
 
The results which emerge are varied and are set out in detail in the body of the 
paper. However, it is worth highlighting three general points which emerge from our 
empirical analysis. The first is that sub-central governments play a key role in 
successful fiscal consolidations. This provides support for the argument that 
understanding sub-central government behavior is important in overall 
macroeconomic stabilization. However, this result is tempered by the observation 
that fiscal decentralization does not seem to necessarily imply loss of control, as 
suggested by some observers (cf Rodden, 2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), or to a 
higher degree of taxation (see Keen 1997). Sub-central governments do not appear 
to react to fiscal consolidation attempts by increasing own taxes. In future work, we 
hope to focus more closely on the implications of alternative forms of fiscal 
decentralization and the level of effective central government control on the nature 
and success of consolidation attempts. 
 
The second general theme is that we present some evidence that cuts in grants play 
an important role in fiscal consolidations. During successful consolidation attempts, 
central governments typically make pronounced and sustained cuts in grants which 
in turn generate cuts in sub-central expenditure. This result is generally supportive of 
the presence of a reverse 'fly-paper' effect. 
 
The third general point is that capital spending is an important adjustment 
mechanism for sub-central governments following fiscal. Although the nature of the 
adjustment does depend on the degree of success of the consolidation, what is 
striking is that capital spending does tend to suffer at sub-central level following a 
fiscal adjustment. This is despite the relatively small size of capital expenditure 
compared to total sub-central budgets, and possibly highlights a degree of short-
termism on the part of local governments in adjusting their fiscal position. 
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Appendix - Data Descriptions 
 
    All variables unless otherwise stated are from the IMF GFS [2002] database and 
are in current prices. 
 
1)  Total Expenditure = [All Current Expenditure (including Wages and Salaries, 
Employer Contributions, other Purchases of Goods and Services, Subsidies, 
Transfers to households and Transfers abroad) less Interest Repayments less 
Transfers to other tiers of national government] + [All Capital Expenditure 
(including acquisition of Fixed Capital Assets, Purchases of Stocks, Purchases 
of Land and Intangible Assets and Capital Transfers) less Capital Transfers to 
other tiers of national government.] 
 
2)  Total revenue = Tax revenue + Non-Tax revenue + Capital Revenue + Grants 
(total grants less grants received from other tiers of national government). 
 
3)  Tax revenue = Income, Corporate and Capital Gains taxation + Social Security 
Contributions + Payroll taxation + Property taxation + Domestic and 
International Indirect taxation. 
 
4) Non-tax revenue = Entrepreneurial and Property Income + Administrative 
Fees and Charges + Fines and Forfeits + Other Non-tax revenue. 
 
5)  Grants = Grants received from other tiers of national government. Grants 
received from super-national authorities such as the EU are excluded. 
 
6)  Social Transfers = Transfers to households and non-profit organizations + 
Subsidies to firms. 
 
7)  Government Wage Bill = Expenditure on Wages and Salaries. 
 
8)  Purchases of Goods and Services = Non-Wage Expenditure on Goods and 
Services. 
 
9) Capital Expenditure = Acquisition of Fixed Capital assets, Purchases of 
Stocks, Land and Intangible Assets + Capital Transfers. 
 
10)  Debt to GDP ratio = Gross National Debt as a percentage of GDP; source 
OECD Statistical Compendium 2002. 
 
11)  GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure approach) at current prices; 
source OECD Statistical Compendium 2002. 
 
12)  Blanchard Fiscal Impulse = (Blanchard Adjusted cyclical balance)t – 
Unadjusted Primary Balance)t-1. 
 
13) Type of government = Based on 'Type of Government' variable in Woldendorp 
et al. (2000). For each year, central government classified either as single 
party majority (i.e. one party in government with a majority in the legislature), 
coalition majority (i.e. two or more parties in government where between the 
  26two they have a majority in the legislature), or minority (i.e. single or multi-
party government without a majority in the legislature). 
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